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The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse 
Mark Tushnet* 
The Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith1 outraged most scholars of the Free Exercise C l a ~ s e . ~  I 
am among the relatively few who believe that the Court 
reached the right doctrinal result in S m i t ? ~ . ~  My reasons are, I 
think, even more idiosyncratic than my position. They are 
founded on my discomfort with the rhetoric of free exercise 
discourse under the pre-Smith regime, in which generous 
promises of sensitivity to eccentric religious practices were 
routinely betrayed. In this essay, I explore the rhetoric of free 
exercise discourse. Part I1 focuses on two aspects of that 
rhetoric: the prevalence of strongly phrased "slippery-slope" 
arguments against Smith and the revitalization of originalist 
arguments in support of pre-Smith law. Part I11 explains why I 
believe that the more honest rhetoric of Smith is, ultimately, 
more respectful of religious exercise, even of religious exercise 
that is suppressed under Smith but that may have been 
protected under the pre-Smith regime. 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank participants 
in the Symposium, especially Edward Gaffney, Emily Fowler Hartigan, Craig 
Mousin, Stephen Pepper, and Ruti Teitel, for their comments on a draft of this 
essay. 
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
2. For citations to the highly critical literature, see James E. Ryan, Smith and 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 
1407, 1409 n.15 (1992). 
3. Some critics of the doctrine the Court amounced in Smith suggest that the 
Court reached the correct result in finding it permissible for a state to refuse to 
exempt from its drug-abuse laws those who use drugs as part of a religious rite 
(or, more narrowly and more controversially, to allow a state to  deny 
unemployment benefits to those fired from their jobs because of their [permissibly 
criminalized] drug use during a religious ceremony). 
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11. "THE SKY IS FALLING": DEALING WITH Smith 
A. Down the Slippery Slope to Religious Persecution 
Understandably, advocates generally find "slippery-slope" 
arguments effective, particularly when they are addressing 
nonspecialists. Therefore, opponents of Smith typically point 
out that, under the Court's new doctrine, governments can 
"dictate the location of an  altar in a Catholic church" or 
"equate[] the rights of churches with the rights of pornographic 
movie theaters.'" Even worse, according to one of the rhetori- 
cally effective anti-Smith slippery-slope arguments, a minister 
who allows minors to participate in communion could be prose- 
cuted under Smith for violating a state's ban on serving alcohol 
to minors. 
Upon inspection, however, the substantive failings of such 
arguments are evident. Indeed, the parade of horribles mar- 
shalled by those attacking Smith apparently broke rank even 
before the march got ~ n d e r w a y . ~  In that sense, the antiSmith 
rhetoric resembles discourse about tort reform or political cor- 
rectness. Horror stories are told to demonstrate the existence of 
serious problems? yet, although some horror stories are doubt- 
less true, readers are given no basis for determining the real 
rate or number of outrages. Accordingly, some skepticism is 
natural, and with regard to the claims that Smith threatens 
religious liberty in some novel way, such skepticism is more 
than justified. In practice, pre-Smith law was not all that pro- 
tective of religious exercise, and because post-Smith law is 
constrained by nonconstitutional factors, the practical reality of 
religious protection after Smith is substantially similar to the 
practical reality of religious protection before Smith was decid- 
ed. 
4. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 
(citing Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 663 @. 
Minn. 1990)). 
5. Sometimes genuine controversy may exist over whether the horribles that 
are paraded are really that horrible. This seems to be particularly true of the 
application of antidiscrimination and labor laws to some aspects of church-related 
operations. For Laycock's examples, see id. at 43-44. The question may be posed, 
"Is there now no constitutional barrier to unionized parochial schools?" Id. at 44. 
For me, if the answer is yes, the sky will not have fallen. 
6. For a discussion of the rhetoric of political correctness, see Mark Tushnet, 
Political Correctness, the Law, and the Legal Academy, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 127 
(1992). 
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To illustrate, consider Laycock's suggestion that Smith 
allows government to determine where an  altar should be lo- 
cated in a particular church. Laycock utilizes this example on 
the first page of his article, significantly titled The Remnants of 
Free Exercise.' Laycock indicates that  "[sltate and local govern- 
ments have already relied on Smith for authority to dictate the 
location of an altar in a Catholic church."' If a reader is less 
than diligent in reviewing Laycock's article and so careless as 
to ignore the footnotes, he or she might think that some gov- 
ernment had actually succeeded in  dictating the altar's loca- 
tion. The appended footnotes, however, deserve some attention. 
Laycock supports his assertion by citing a brief filed by the 
Boston Landmarks Commission in  the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial C ~ u r t . ~  Fifty-five pages later, the reader attentive to 
footnotes will discover that the Massachusetts court "ignor[ed] 
Smith and grant[ed] religious exemptions under [the] state 
const i t~t ion."~~ While advocates writing briefs will "rely on" 
whatever they think helpful to their client's position, whether 
their arguments accurately reflect the law is quite another 
matter. Treating the threat to the altar's location as posing a 
real risk of religious persecution is an overstatement. 
The altar location case explicitly illustrates one set of con- 
straints on the post-Smith regime. In addition, it implicitly di- 
rects attention to the most important feature of the pre-Smith, 
regime. The Federal Constitution is not the only limiting force 
that keeps governments from engaging in religious persecution. 
Consider the example of serving liquor to minors a t  commu- 
nion. Before someone could say that the Supreme Court's deci- 
sion in Smith contributed to a minister's imprisonment, he or 
she would first need to consider the other barriers to the 
minister's prosecution that would need to be overcome before 
such a prosecution could be successful. First, a local prosecutor 
must decide to prosecute the minister. If, as the example is 
designed to show, the prospect of such a prosecution is truly 
horrible, we might imagine that the prosecutor would think 
long and hard about how such a prosecution would affect his or 
7. Laycock, supra note 4, at 1. 
8. Id. at 1-2. 
9. Id. at 2 n.4. 
10. Id. at 55 11.218. For a discussion of postSmith cases under state constitu- 
tions, see Neil C. McCabe, The State and Federal Religion Clauses: Differences of 
Degree and Kind, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 49, 51-62 (1992). 
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her chance for reelection. Next, the courts, including the state's 
highest court, must determine that  the statute banning the 
service of liquor to minors should not be construed to include 
a n  exemption for religious practices. Additionally, those courts 
must reject the argument that the state's constitution adopts a 
stricter standard in its free exercise provision than the federal 
standard articulated in Smith. All of these possibilities might 
occur. Given the political pressures that would generate such a 
(hypothesized) prosecution, however, one is entitled to wonder 
whether federal courts applying pre-Smith law would have 
stood up to such pressures. 
Of course, the horror stories may have a fundion apart 
from their "predictive" value with regard to Smith's conse- 
quences. Using symbols the reader values, they may be de- 
signed to mobilize the reader's sympathies by illustrating the 
impact Smith had on the Native Americans who were denied 
the ability to use peyote in their ceremonies. Readers who, in 
their religious exercise, view communion as having a sacred 
prominence similar to that of peyote for the Native American 
Church are invited to imagine what it would feel like if the 
government denied their children the opportunity to participate 
in the ceremony. 
For some audiences, this rhetorical device may work. Oth- 
ers, however, may deny that the peyote .ceremony is at all simi- 
lar to communion. They may argue that one is an animist ritu- 
al while the other is participation in the one true church; or, 
that  one is drug abuse while the other is a religious ceremony. 
Thomas Nagel makes the point more generally: 
This is really a problem of how to  interpret the familiar 
role-reversal argument in ethics: "How would you like it if 
someone did that to you?" That argument invites the further 
question, "How would I like it if someone did what to me?" 
Since there is more than one true description of every action, 
the selection of the morally operative one is crucial. If some- 
one believes that by restricting freedom of worship he is sav- 
ing innocent people from the risks of eternal damnation to 
which they are exposed by deviation from the true faith, then 
under that description he presumably would want others t o  
do the same for him, if he were in spiritual danger. But under 
the description "restricting freedom of worship," he wouldn't 
want others to do i t  to him, since in light of the fact that his 
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is the true faith, this would be to hinder his path to salva- 
tion. l1 
Regardless of whether they are used as prediction or rhe- 
torical trope, the horribles paraded by those opposing Smith 
implicitly illustrate that pre-Smith law dealing with historic 
preservation law and church property was not that protec- 
tive." For example, Laycock indignantly discusses the Second 
Circuit's decision upholding the  designation of St.  
Eartholomew's Church as a historic landmark, which severely 
impaired the church's ability to raise money for its religiously 
motivated charitable operations. But Laycock fails to point out 
that the Second Circuit af%irmed a district court's application of 
pre-Smith law.'' 
Indeed, the point is much more general. As Judge Noonan 
and others have shown,14 the actual protection afforded reli- 
gious exercise by the Supreme Court and federal appellate 
courts applying pre-Smith law is not nearly as great a s  post- 
Smith rhetoric suggests. One enumeration lists seventeen Su- 
preme Court cases between 1963 and 1990 addressing free 
exercise claims, of which only four (twenty-three percent) pre- 
vailed.15 Similarly, out of ninety-seven cases in the courts of 
appeals during the 1980s, free exercise claims prevailed in  only 
twelve (twelve percent)? Another article, compiling almost 
11. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 162 (1991). Nagel's example flips 
the Smith problem around, but the analytic point remains the same. 
12. See, e.g., Lakewood Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City 
of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a municipal zoning ordi- 
nance which prohibited the construction of church buildings in virtually all residen- 
tial districts of the city did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Grosz v. Miami 
Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a zoning ordinance prohibiting 
church meetings in homes was constitutional). 
13. Rector of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 
F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991), discussed in Laycock, 
supra note 4, a t  57-58. Laycock treats cases involving "judicial destruction of a mi- 
nority faithn through the imposition of "multi-million dollar tort judgments" in simi- 
lar fashion. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1014-15 & n.89 (1990) (citing cases im- 
posing liability under preSmith law). 
14. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 627-29 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(Noonan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). On the cited pages, 
Judge Noonan lists 72 courts of appeals cases raising free exercise claims, of which 
seven (nine percent) prevailed. 
15. Ryan, supra note 2, at 1458. Of the four cases, three were unemployment 
compensation cases that the Court found indistinguishable from Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963), the doctrinal source of preSmith law. 
16. Ryan, supra note 2, a t  1459-62. 
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one hundred pre-Smith cases from state supreme courts and 
federal courts of appeals for a period ending in 1989, found 
that  the free exercise claim was sustained in only fourteen of 
eighty-five cases (sixteen percent). l7 
Candid critics of Smith acknowledge this rather dismal 
picture of the regime to which they wish to return.'' Of course 
a twenty-five percent chance of winning, under pre-Smith law 
in  practice, is better than no chance of winning under Smith. 
Still, the change occasioned by Smith is not a change from the 
bright daylight of religious freedom to the dark night of reli- 
gious persecution. If the metaphor is apt, even before Smith it 
was deep twilight. 
The defense of the pre-Smith regime takes a peculiar turn 
when these statistics are raised. Admitting that the chances of 
winning litigated cases under pre-Smith law were not really 
that  favorable, defenders of pre-Smith law suggest that Smith 
impaired religious freedom not so much by changing the ulti- 
mate outcome in cases that are litigated, but by taking an 
argument away from those defending religious liberty. Under 
pre-Smith law, opponents of regulation could point out that the 
proposals they were fighting had to serve a compelling state 
interest. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that courts found 
things "compelling" that lay observers might consider rather 
unimportant, in the arena of legislation and negotiation the 
compelling state interest argument was often effective. 
By removing the free exercise issue from the bargaining 
table, Smith necessarily eliminates the potential effectiveness 
of the free exercise argument and its compelling state interest 
standard. Of course, because it frequently failed if a case went 
to litigation, the free exercise argument was usually not a pow- 
erful bargaining chip to begin with. Smith essentially changes 
the probability of the argument's success from low to nothing a t  
all. Nevertheless, the defense seems to go, because lawyers 
representing religious institutions tend to be better than their 
government opponents, the former can flimflam the latter into 
17. Anthony A. Cavallo, The Free Exercise of Religion: Is It Truly Free or 
Merely Convenient to the States? (Spring 1990) (unpublished paper, on file with 
author). I am grateful to Professor Gerard Bradley for making this paper available 
to me. 
18. The only area in which free exercise claims prevailed with some regularity 
are prison food and appearance cases. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 1434-37 (noting 
that cases were "judged under a less exacting standard than the compelling inter- 
est test" and suggesting that outcomes would therefore not be changed by Smith). 
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giving up some of their position by presenting them with a n  
argument that probably will not succeed. Having to confront 
even a low-probability risk of losing, city and state attorneys 
will be more accommodating than if they face no risk a t  all. 
As a hard-line legal realist, I have some sympathy with 
this argument, but I doubt that taking pre-Smith doctrine 
away from these superior lawyers really makes it that much 
harder for them to prevail. Smith does not, after all, guarantee 
that government regulators will win; they may lose on various 
statutory or state constitutional grounds. In  addition, in light 
of its weaknesses, the mere fact that the free exercise argu- 
ment is a constitutional one should not influence bargaining 
positions in any significant way. Perhaps the absence of the 
free exercise argument would make a difference if it rested 
upon a clear constitutional mandate, and deprived of it, law- 
yers for religious institutions were relegated to obscure argu- 
ments about implied exceptions to otherwise clear statutory 
language. But again, pre-Smith law was not clear enough to 
provide that kind of clear constitutional argument. Hence, al- 
though Smith dictates a marginal shift in the bargaining con- 
text, that shift is too small to justify the strong claims found in  
anti-Smith rhetoric as to just how terrible Smith's effects 
are. 
B. Back to the Founders 
Smith appeared just before Michael Mcconnell's major 
reexamination of the original understanding of free exercise 
was published in the Haruard Law Review?' In a petition for 
rehearing, the Smith Court was told that McConnell's article 
"demonstrates that the broader reading of the [Free Exercise] 
Clause rejected by the Court was contemplated by the Framers 
of the First Amendment."21 One commentator says that 
19. One real effect on bargaining should be noted. Before Smith, litigators could 
sometimes structure their cases under the Civil Rights Ad.  42 U.S.C. 5 1983 
(1988). If they prevailed, even-to some extent-on nonconstitutional grounds (if 
those grounds were in some important sense related to the free exercise claim), 
they would be entitled to attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. 5 1988 (1988). After Smith, the 
chances of recovering attorneys' fees in such a case are much smaller. Smith, that 
is, reduced the stakes of losing for government regulators. 
20. Michael W. McCo~el l ,  The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1410 (1990). 
21. Petition for Rehearing at  5, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, reh'g 
denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). The petition refers, without citation a t  this point, to 
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Mcconnell "conclud[es] that the framers .believed that the [Free 
Exercise Clause] requires exemptions from generally applicable 
laws that burden religious  practice^."^^ 
McConnell's conclusions were in fact more qualified. He 
found that religious exemptions were familiar to the Framers' 
generation, and that some evidence indicated that pre-Smith 
free exercise doctrine was compatible with the Framers' under- 
standing of free exercise. Many of Mcconnell's readers, on the 
other hand, believe his article stands for the stronger proposi- 
tion that pre-Smith doctrine was "what the Framers intended." 
That his readers would reach that conclusion is quite under- 
standable. McConnell's article employs the best sort of 'law 
office history," a rhetorical form designed to give historical evi- 
dence favorable to an advocate's position the most weight it can 
bear, while a t  the same time explaining away apparently unfa- 
vorable evidence. 
Although McConnell's formal conclusions are carefully 
he regularly construes ambiguous evidence in  fa- 
vor of his interpretation, when it could just as easily be con- 
strued against it. For example, in examining the history sur- 
rounding the drafting of the First Amendment, he treats chang- 
es to the Amendment's language that seem to go against man- 
datory exemptions as "no more than stylistic" changes or "mis- 
transcription[s]." He massages other changes to show that they 
are a t  least consistent with the view that exemptions are man- 
d a t o r ~ . ~ ~  
Perhaps more dramatically, he  summarizes t he  
postadoption judicial interpretations of the principle of free 
exercise in this way: 
One lower court in New York squarely adopted the exemp- 
tions interpretation, and the supreme courts of Pennsylvania 
and South Carolina rejected it. None of these decisions was 
"recent research on the history of the Free Exercise Clause." Id. Elsewhere it re- 
fers to McCo~ell 's article as a "detailed recitation of the origins of the Free Exer- 
cise Clause." Id. at 11. Professor McCo~e l l  was one of 55 law professors who were 
of counsel on the petition for rehearing. 
22. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HAFW. L. REV. 129, 
209 n.91 (1990). 
23. See, e.g., McCo~ell ,  supra note 20, at 1420 (stating that "[tlhe historical 
record casts doubt on" the current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause) (em- 
phasis added); id. at 1513 (stating that "[tlhe history subsequent to adoption of the 
first amendment is inconclusive but tends to point against exemptions," but that 
the cases are "weak indicators of the original understanding"). 
24. See id. at 1482-83. 
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handed down within twenty years of the [First Amendment], 
and they are therefore weak indicators of the original under- 
standing. The Pennsylvania holding is entitled to especially 
little weight since i t  was connected to a rejection of constitu- 
tional judicial review in general.25 
As stated, this conclusion is accurate, but it overlooks material 
that McConnell, an honest scholar, had previously presented. 
McConnell's conclusion simply ignores a 1793 Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court holding that rejected a religious exemption." 
The Pennsylvania court reached its holding within two years of 
the First Amendment's adoption, and as far as we can tell, the 
court's holding was not connected to some principled opposition 
to judicial review. Of course, McConnell might respond, as 
lawyers drafting briefs typically do, that the 1793 holding is 
"cryptic" and ~ne labora t ed .~~  Still, one inclined to a different 
interpretation might evaluate the evidence differently. 
The evidence is compatible with this alternative interpreta- 
tion: Every appellate court that considered the question in the 
decades after the adoption of the First Amendment rejected the 
argument that the principle of free exercise required that re- 
ligious believers be exempted fkom compliance with generally 
applicable statutes. One unreported decision of a New York 
trial court supports exemptions, but that decision survives only 
because one of the lawyers in the case distributed the decision 
in pamphlet form; there is no reason to believe that the opinion 
or pamphlet reflected anything more than one judge's views. 
Perhaps the understanding of the free exercise principle 
changed in the decades after 1791, but the religious history of 
this country does not suggest that such a dramatic transforma- 
tion occurred. Thus, taken as a whole, the evidence of 
postadoption interpretation strongly suggests that the free 
exercise principle does not require the government to exempt 
religious believers from generally applicable laws. 
Mcconnell's article also obscures another difficulty. He 
ends his discussion of early judicial interpretations by saying 
that "the actual practice favored exemptions, even though the 
appellate decisions went the other way."" To the modern ear, 
this immediately triggers the thought that the Constitution did 
25. Id. at 1513. 
26. Id. at 1504 (citing Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793)). 
27. See id. 
28. Id. at 1511. 
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not require religious exemptions precisely because practice 
favored them. In modern terms, practice involves decisions to 
extend exemptions as a matter of public policy-decisions made 
by the executive and legislative branches of government, not 
the courts. Such permissible accommodations of religion raise 
no free exercise questions at all, but only questions about 
whether they violate the antiestablishment principle. In con- 
trast, pre-Smith doctrine dealt with mandatory accommoda- 
tions of religion-those accommodations as to which legisla- 
tures are deprived of choice by the free exercise principle. Ac- 
cordingly, some 200 years of legislative practice may indicate 
that  exemptions are not required by the free exercise princi- 
p l e a  conclusion that is at least marginally strengthened by 
McConnel17s devotion of several pages in his article to an exam- 
ination of such permissive legislative accommodations.29 
Of course, one can construct an argument connecting the 
legislative practice of extending religious exemptions to a doc- 
trine of mandatory accommodation. According to that argu- 
ment, prior to the First Amendment's adoption, legislatures 
were the only government institutions available to enforce a 
generally agreed-upon principle that religious beliefs must be 
accommodated by government. When they enacted accommoda- 
tions of religion, legislators were not-in their own eyesdoing  
something they were merely permitted to do; rather, they were 
doing what they believed the fundamental principle of free 
exercise required them to do. That is, pre-1791 practice reflects 
a principle that was ultimately articulated in the First Amend- 
ment. 
Following the Amendment's adoption, the judiciary was 
available to enforce the principle of mandatory accommodation 
when legislatures failed to accommodate religious exercise 
voluntarily. And, McConnell argues, the best interpretation of 
the standard used in legislative practices-language akin to 
"destructive of peace and good order7'-is the equivalent of pre- 
Smith doctrine. As McConnell puts it: 
If, . . . as seems to be the case, the exemptions were granted 
because legislatures believed the free exercise principle re- 
quired them, it is reasonable to suppose that framers of con- 
stitutional free exercise provisions understood that similar 
applications of the principle would be made by the courts, 
29. Id. at 1466-73. 
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once courts were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing 
the mandates of free e~ercise.~' 
Admittedly, this is an  ingenious argument, but it is a n  argu- 
ment not strongly supported by history because only one court 
seems to have accepted a principle of mandatory accommoda- 
tion following the First Amendment's adoption in 1791. 
As a historian, McConnell is a fine lawyer. Like nearly all 
efforts to invoke original understanding to support contempo- 
rary positions in constitutional law, his analysis resolves evi- 
dentiary ambiguities with more precision than the evidence 
justifies and, more important, imposes a modern frame of 
thinking on old material with which it does not comfortably fit. 
Like the "slippery-slope" rhetoric's exaggeration of the differ- 
ence between the protections afforded religious liberty before 
and after Smith, Mcconnell's analysis of the Framers' original 
understanding exaggerates the similarities between the 
Framers' understanding and the doctrine the Supreme Court 
adhered to before Smith. 
C. A Modern Paradigm 
A case involving Georgetown University provides a final 
example of the rhetoric of free exercise scholarship and serves 
as a useful transition to Part I11 of this essay. Gay Rights Co- 
alition v. Georgetown University3' is regularly offered as an 
example of how government can impose severe regulatory con- 
straints on the religiously dictated aspects of a religious 
organization's operations when it is pursuing interest-group in- 
fluenced legislative agendas-agendas that are well-intentioned 
and arguably desirable when applied to nonreligious institu- 
tions. As Laycock puts it, the case illustrates the kind of clash 
between religion and government in which "churches . . . find 
that they simply cannot practice important parts of their faith, 
even within the enclave of the religious comm~ni ty ."~~ 
The case involved the application of the District of Colum- 
30. Id. at 1473. To the extent that M c C o ~ e l l  presents evidence of the reasons 
for enacting accommodations, it seems to me to point against principle and in 
favor of policy, as in his quotation from the resolution of the Continental Congress. 
Id. at 1469 (certain exemptions made grudgingly in recognition of "alleged scruple 
of conscience"); id. at 1470 (diEculty in enforcing assessments for support of reli- 
gious establishments). 
31. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
32. Laycock, supra note 4, at 56. 
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bia human rights ordinance to the student activities programs 
of Georgetown University, an institution aniliated with the 
Society of Jesus. The human rights ordinance bans discrimina- 
tion on the basis of sexual orientation, and the gay-rights 
plaintiffs contended that, because the University "recognized" 
other student groups, i t  had to "recognize" the gay-rights group 
on equal terms. The University was willing to provide facilities 
to the group on an  equal basis-allowing it to reserve rooms, 
use bulletin boards, and the like-but contended that any fur- 
ther "recognition" of the group would constitute a form of en- 
dorsement inconsistent with the University's religious commit- 
ments. In interpreting the ordinance, the court of appeals held 
that the city required the University to provide services and 
facilities to gay-rights groups on the same terms it provided 
them to other student organizations, but it did not find that the 
ordinance required the University to formally "recognize" the 
group* 
Two aspects of the Georgetown gay-rights case deserve 
note. First, it shows that a case often presented as an example 
of how religious institutions can be persecuted is not at all a 
good example of persecution. From the University's point of 
view, the government was not attempting to persecute it or 
otherwise violate its religious commitments by applying the 
human rights ordinance to the University's student activities 
program. In  fact, the University did not find that the ordi- 
nance, as interpreted by the court of appeals, intruded on any 
of its religious commitments. Moreover, although Congress has 
enacted a statute barring the District of Columbia from enforc- 
ing its human rights ordinance against religious institutions, 
Georgetown has not relied on that statute or changed the way 
it treats the gay-rights group. Thus, Smith is completely irrele- 
vant to the Georgetown story; the government asked nothing of 
the University that conflicted with its religious commitments. 
Second, I do not mean to suggest that reaching the ulti- 
mate outcome in the gay-rights case was painless to the Uni- 
- 
versity. The positions the University took in litigation some- 
times caused unnecessary difficulty within the institution itself, 
particularly because the distinction between "recognition" and 
equal treatment with respect to facilities was both ill-defined 
and difficult to explain to the numerous University constitu- 
encies. In the end, however, the difficulties associated with the 
litigation were productive. For over a decade, the University's 
constituencies received an  education in the University's reli- 
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gious commitments: they were forced to confront the implica- 
tions and commitments entailed in Georgetown's affiliation 
with the Society of Jesus. Such confrontation suggests a differ- 
ent perspective on law-religion relations after Smith. 
111. LIVING WITH Smith: THE RELIGION-STATE INTERACTION 
From the outside, a religious institution's religious commit- 
ments are often taken as somehow fixed in advance: there sim- 
ply "is" a Catholic or Baptist position on controversial issues, 
which can be identified in authoritative statements fiom lead- 
ers of the affected religious communities. I t  is as if everyone 
knew what Georgetown's affiliation with the Society of Jesus 
implied for the question of gay rights. In fact, the story is sig- 
nificantly more complicated. 
On the most superficial level, one must distinguish be- 
tween a religion's position and the statements made by reli- 
gious leaders.33 In congregational churches, statements by 
ministers ordinarily do not define the church's position. Even in  
hierarchical churches, statements by authoritative leaders may 
not be authoritative as to the government regulation a t  issue. 
The Pope, for example, has issued statements about homosew- 
ality-not all of which have equal authoritative status. Indeed, 
the implications of those statements for a Jesuit university's 
treatment of student organizations devoted to promoting gay 
rights are not self-evident. And, because the Society of Jesus 
has a special legal position within the Catholic Church, state- 
ments specifically directed at the gay-rights issue by the Cardi- 
nal with jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, for example, 
may not be authoritative." Accordingly, if "the church's" posi- 
tion can be contested from within the church, and if some with- 
in the church find acceding to a particular government regula- 
tion either acceptable or affirmatively desirable, it is not evi- 
33. In this analysis, I put to one side the issues that arise when a person 
unaffiliated with a church claims that his or her personal religious beliefs impel 
some action (or when a person affiliated with a church claims that his or her 
personal religious beliefs, which differ from those of church leaders, impel some 
action). The Court held it irrelevant, for purposes of the constitutional analysis 
required by the Free Exercise Clause, that a person's beliefs were "not compelled 
by their religion." Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 US. 829, 834 
(1989). 
34. I find it at least moderately interesting that the gay-rights controversy 
implicated Georgetown, affiliated with the Society of Jesus, not Catholic University, 
a pontifical university with a different legal relation to the Cardinal and the Pope. 
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dent to me why those who are not church members ought to be 
troubled by the Court's decision in Smith.35 
More important, a church will usually not have a well- 
defined position on a particular government regulation when 
the regulation is proposed or goes into effect. Leaders often use 
the regulation and the burdens it places on their church to 
develop a particularized position. For example, as the litigation 
proceeded, Georgetown's leaders began to refine their under- 
standing of what "recognition" might entail, and they developed 
proposals for how the University might relate to the gay-rights 
group in ways short of formal "recognition." In more general 
terms, confrontations between government and religious insti- 
tutions may force both institutions to think in more sustained 
and focused ways about their own commitments. Such delibera- 
tions might otherwise not occur were the government to as- 
sume that it could not regulate any aspect of the institution's 
operations because some people, although not the institution 
itself (when the controversy began), believed that regulation 
adversely affected the institution's religious commitments. 
To state it yet another way, religious commitments are not 
predefined and knowable in  the abstract. Rather, they are 
produced at least in part by complex negotiations. Some negoti- 
ations occur within religious institutions. Often the government 
does not occupy the position of "other" to all members of a 
religious community. Some church members will agree with the 
position asserted by the government, and, acting from within 
the church, will argue that a careful consideration of the 
church's religious commitments will reveal that the church can 
comply with both its faith and the government's demands. To 
revert to the "interest group" image of government regulation, 
church members are also members of the interest groups that 
pressure the government to act. 
Sometimes, too, church members are initially so bound up 
with what they view as the church's "requirements" that they 
35. The critical observation that someone is "more Catholic than the Pope" cap- 
tures something of this. Professor Hancock's response on this point suggests his 
adoption of a version of the "slippery-slope" argument to which Nagel's comment, 
supra text accompanying note 11, is an answer. See Ralph C. Hancock, Monistic 
and Dualistic Paths to Radical Secularism: Comments on Tushnet, 1993 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 141. It also suggests the fear that someone inside a church might end up as 
a qoser" at the conclusion of the church's internal discussions. As I indicate below, 
see infia text accompanying note 36, I do not believe that the law on this matter 
should be shaped by the view of such people. 
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overlook or undervalue the secular policies the government 
seeks to promote through its general regulations. A forceful 
statement by the government may encourage those believers to 
take a more thoughtful approach to the religion's commitments. 
In turn, this increased attention to religious commitment, occa- 
sioned by the government's regulatory efforts, leads to dialogue 
within a religious institution. 
The dialogue might result in a position the church had not 
taken before, or it might result in the church becoming even 
more firmly committed to its prior position, now with a greater 
appreciation of the relation between that position and its fun- 
damental faith  commitment^.^^ Such dialogue also extends 
beyond the boundaries of the church. Church'members are 
usually voters, and they can demonstrate politically their dis- 
comfort with the government's demands. Even small sects can 
mobilize support from other churches by invoking general con- 
cerns about freedom of religion. This is borne out by the enact- 
ment of statutory exemptions for peyote use by the Native 
American Church. In this sense, churches are interest groups 
too. And, of course, just as church members may reconsider 
what commitment to their faith requires when confronted with 
a particular government regulation, government regulators 
may reconsider what their secular goals require when con- 
fronted with resistance by churches. 
These "negotiations" can produce a deeper-or at least a 
different-understanding of what the institution's religious 
commitments really are, both within and without the institu- 
tion. In  this sense, the benefits of government efforts to regu- 
late religious institutions include the possibility that such ef- 
forts will enhance the institution's religious commitments 
through clarification of those commitments. If it had been clear 
from the outset that the District of Columbia simply could not 
apply its human rights ordinance in  any way to Georgetown, 
the occasion for the University's serious and extended inquiry 
into the meaning of its religious commitment would have been 
deferred or, perhaps, lost entirely. 
To all this one might respond that, however beneficial to a 
church this sort of interaction and dialogue might be, surely 
36. To the extent that Professor Hancock's response is predicated on his deter- 
mination that I hold views that I expressly disclaim, here and elsewhere, I cannot 
respond to it except by suggesting that readers can consider whether his interpre- 
tation of my text is accurate. 
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Smith does not promote it. For, under Smith, the government 
can take the position that it is bound to prevail no matter how 
the church's discussions come out. Why bother, then, to strug- 
gle within the church over what its commitments entail? If the 
church changes its position, why should anyone treat that 
change as "clarifying" its commitments rather than submitting 
to the sheer power of the state? 
To answer the fmst question, it is helpful to remember the 
nonconstitutional protections of religious exercise. State con- 
stitutional law, statutory interpretation, executive discretion, 
and most important, legislative discretion, all combine to pro- 
tect religious exercise. Observing a dialogue within the church 
concerning some regulation that could be imposed on the 
church without violating the Federal Constitution pursuant to  
Smith, legislators, executive officials, and judges might consid- 
er alternative ways of accomplishing their goals. For example, 
if the discussions within Georgetown demonstrate that the 
institution has particular difEculties with formal "recognition" 
of a gay-rights group, perhaps the relevant statute could be 
interpreted to require the University to provide equal treat- 
ment in all respects short of formal recognition. Thus, those 
within the church would be foolish to throw up their hands-or 
view themselves as facing an onslaught of persecution-when 
faced with burdensome regulation, for conducting an internal 
discussion to define more precisely the meaning of the church's 
commitments might produce benefits to the church, even if that 
dialogue results in reiterating the church's opposition to the 
proposed regulation. 
Answering the second question-why should a change in 
position by the church be treated as clarification rather than 
submission-requires a more extended discussion. We should 
begin by asking who is raising this question. An outsider might 
be skeptical about church leaders' claims that they truly do 
believe that complying with the government's regulation is 
consistent with their "new" understanding of their religious 
commitments. But, again, it is not clear to  me why the 
outsider's perspective is relevant. 
Consider next the possibility that those who Yost" within 
the church are raising the question. They believe that their 
church's original understanding of its commitments was truer 
to their faith and what they view as the faith of their church 
than its new one. Why, though, should their vision of the true 
faith prevail over what is, at least hypothetically, the vision 
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offered by the church's authoritative leaders? 
In short, it seems to me that the position the church takes 
after conducting its internal dialogue must be received, for 
legal and religious purposes, as an authoritative statement of 
the church's religious commitments. Moreover, it must be 
viewed as authoritative even if it is a dramatic change from an 
earlier position and even if the change appears to have been 
induced by threats of government oppression. As a thought 
experiment, suppose that one hundred years pass, and as histo- 
rians we then examine the church's position. It is certainly 
possible that we will see the new position as unauthentic-a 
mere submission to coercive state pressure. Here, the position 
Georgetown ended up taking in the gay-rights litigation would 
be seen as a failure of nerve and faith. Yet, it seems possible as 
well that we will see the old position as unauthentic-resting 
on a thoughtless failure to consider the implications of the 
church's fundamental commitments and faith when ap- 
proaching problems that were unforeseen by those who formu- 
lated the old position. Pursuant to this alternative view, the 
position Georgetown initially took in the gay-rights litigation 
would be understood as a thoughtless adherence to  mindless 
traditi~n.~' 
It seems worth mentioning that churches reconsider the 
implications of their commitments in response t o  a wide range 
of social forces. Churches have rethought their positions on gay 
rights in jurisdictions that never tried to apply human rights 
ordinances t o  them. Women have been ordained in denomina- 
tions that previously strenuously resisted that change, without 
any law being brought to bear, and indeed in the face of ex- 
press exemptions from civil rights laws. I doubt that anyone 
could seriously defend the proposition that these changes are 
unauthentic capitulations to  social pressure (although, again, 
outsiders and "losers" have put forth that proposition; and 
again, with hindsight they may indeed be viewed as capitula- 
tions). 
If we cannot reasonably treat such voluntary changes as 
capitulations (without demonstrating disrespect for a church's 
own statements about its faith commitments), why can changes 
induced by government regulation be viewed in that way? ' 
37.. It should be clear, and if not this note should make it clear, that I take no 
position on the authenticity of either Georgetown's pre- or postlitigation interpreta- 
tion of what its religious commitments require. 
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While i t  is analytically possible to distinguish sharply between 
changes induced by dialogues responding to noncoercive social 
forces and those induced by dialogues responding to the threat 
of coercion, only lawyers would consider that  distinction impor- 
tant, particularly in a society and culture like the United 
States that is generally, though not universally, tolerant with 
respect to religious matters. From within a church, the distinc- 
tion between mere social pressure and state coercion is not 
categorical; what matters is which is stronger, and, again, only 
lawyers would think that the threat of state coercion is categor- 
ically stronger than social pressure. 
In  the end, of course, Smith means that a government may 
disregard a church's religious commitments and impose bur- 
densome regulations. Even this, however, has some facets 
worth examining to determine whether something can be sal- 
vaged for religious liberty. 
I begin with observations about the uneasiness I feel in 
seeing religious institutions seek exemptions from general 
regulations. One source of my uneasiness is really no more 
than a suspicion or a sense about constitutional interpretation 
in the free exercise area-a suspicion that is confirmed by the 
Supreme Court's behavior prior to Smith, and by Justice 
O'Comor's concurring opinion therein. Stated simply, I believe 
that courts interpreting the Constitution to require some ex- 
emptions, for some religious institutions, and for some religious 
practices, are likely to do so in a troublingly discriminatory 
manner. The closer a practice is to the mainstream, the more 
likely it is that the courts will find no compelling interest for 
the regulation. 
The overall effect of such discriminatory extension of reli- 
gious exercise exemptions creates three levels of free exercise 
law. First, legislatures protect truly mainstream religions by 
enacting exemptions under the doctrine of permissible accom- 
modation of religion or by avoiding enactments that have a 
troublesome impact on mainstream practices. Second, courts 
protect religions on the close-in borders of the mainstream. 
Third, neither the courts nor the legislature protect exotic reli- 
gions. In eliminating the possibility of this type of discrimina- 
tion, Smith eliminates the second tier. This elimination does 
not come without cost, but it has some benefits that  are too 
easily overlooked. 
The courts defined the boundary between the second and 
third tiers under pre-Smith law. In this regard, Justice 
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O'Connor's opinion in Smith is instructive. Justice O'Connor 
applied pre-Smith law and found a substantial burden on free 
exercise, but concluded that the burden was justified by the 
government's compelling interest in promoting a drug-free 
society? Surely, were one to predict the outcome under any 
test, the religious claimants were bound to lose this case;3g 
the only question was how they were going to lose?' Pre- 
Smith doctrine enabled Justice O'Connor to present herself as 
a person serious about problems of religious intolerance and 
concerned about the imposition of unnecessary damage on a 
minority religious community. At the same time, pre-Smith law 
allowed her to impose the very damage she was ostensibly 
concerned about. In other words, presmith doctrine is too 
comforting to judges who often act similarly to other power- 
wielders. Accordingly, when its magnitude is honestly mea- 
sured, eliminating a judicially rationalized discrimination 
among religions is a benefit that may well outweigh the cost to 
religious liberty occasioned by Smith. 
My uneasiness about the discriminatory extension of reli- 
gious exemptions is paralleled by an uneasiness with Establish- 
ment Clause doctrine regarding government use of religious 
symbols. As is well known, the Court's Establishment Clause 
doctrine gives governments incentives to represent that the 
symbols they deploy are not religious, at least not deeply or 
seriously religioudl This is particularly true when govern- 
ments are embroiled in litigation over the symbols they have 
employed. To my mind, it seems not wildly idealistic to think 
that, on the whole, religions would be better off if the govern- 
ment adhered to a strict separationist position with regard to 
religious symbols. At a minimum, such a n  approach would 
38. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905-07 (1990) (O'Comor, J., con- 
curring). 
39. Imagine the headlines and the editorial comments had the case come out 
the other way: "Supreme Court Says Drug Agencies Cannot Fire Drug Users." 
40. I acknowledge that, formally speaking, two Justices who joined Justice 
Scalia's opinion for the Court might have said, "If we are required to apply the 
'compelling state interest' test, we find ourselves reluctantly compelled to find no 
such interest here, and therefore hold for the claimants." For a version of such a 
statement by a Justice who joined Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, see Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). I cannot, however, 
identify who those Justices might be. 
41. For a comment to this effect, see Kenneth Karst, The First Amendment, the 
Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
503, 522-24 (1992). 
136 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
enable religious symbols to be truly religious. 
PreSmith doctrine also gave judges incentives to minimize 
the seriousness of the intrusions on religious liberty that they 
routinely authorized. The parallel to the Establishment Clause 
argument is that perhaps religions would be better off if deci- 
sion-makers were forced to face up to the harm they inflicted 
on religious liberty. Pre-Smith law encouraged decision-makers 
to pass the buck. A legislator or an assistant prosecutor would 
say, ;We shouldn't do this because it infringes on religious 
liberty." Naturally, given the country's legal culture, someone 
would respond by saying something like, "The courts will sort 
out the constitutional issue, so we can do what we think is 
sound policy." Yet, when the cases were heard in court, the 
judges actually applied a weak "compelling state interest" test, 
including deference to the legislature. Ultimately, they ended 
up saying, 'Well, the legislature thought that it had a good 
reason for adopting this regulation despite its impact on reli- 
gious minorities, and who are we to displace its judgment?" 
The result of this process was that no one ever really consid- 
ered the statute's impact on religious minorities, who were 
persecuted without anyone taking responsibility. At least under 
Smith, people know whose hands are bloody. 
Finally, a third source of my uneasiness is that pre-Smith 
law put religious believers in the position of supplicants and 
may have confounded two domains of life that ought to be kept 
separate.42 One reading of James Madison's Memorial and 
~ e m o n s t r a n c e ~ ~  offers a sectarian justification for this almost 
jurisdictional separation. Madison claimed that a person's duty 
to God is "precedent both in order and time, and in degree of 
obligation, to the claims of civil society," from which he con- 
cluded that "in matters of religion, no man's right is abridged 
by the institution of civil so~iety.'"~ Thus, "[tlhe religion . . . of 
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of 
every man."45 
42. I acknowledge that this uneasiness should be presentand, in my case, is 
presentin c o ~ e d i o n  with requests for legislative accommodations of religious 
exercise. That, in part, accounts for the parenthetical in the title of my first essay 
on legislative accommodations, Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommo- 
dation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988). 
43. JAMES MADISON, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE 
(Lincoln & Edmonds 1819). 
44. Id. at 6. 
45. Id .a t5 .  
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Madison wrote against a background of an established 
church. When the government in that environment enacts leg- 
islation respecting religion, it claims authority to do so because 
of its religious warrant. If those living under such a regime 
accede to its claims, they give a human institution authority 
equivalent to that of Deity.46 A state with an established 
church, to the extent that it claims authority to determine for 
its citizens what they ought in conscience do, is idolatrous. As 
Madison put it, religious establishments, considered in this 
way, "impl[y] . . . that the civil magistrate is a competent judge 
of religious truth," which is "an arrogant preten~ion."~ "[Nlo 
man's right is abridged by the institution of civil society," then, 
because no human institution can-when the concepts of au- 
thority and Deity are properly understood--displace the au- 
thority of Deity. 
Two points should be noted about this interpretation of 
Madison's thought. First, as Professor McConnell has stated, 
the question of free exercise exemptions arises only when "a 
law or government practice . . . makes no reference to religion 
and has a secular justification unrelated to the suppression of 
religion."48 Yet, the secular justifications for these practices 
indicate that the government is not claiming religious authority 
as their basis.4g Therefore, they are not expressions of the sort 
of idolatry to which, on my interpretation, Madison's thought 
46. My thoughts along these lines have been influenced by comments made by 
Stanley Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder at a conference on "Religious Freedom: 
Exemptions Based on Conscience." The conference was held at the Georgetown 
University Law Center on April 3-4, 1989, as part of the University's bicentennial 
celebration. I do not suggest, however, that Hauerwas or Yoder would agree with 
my conclusions. See John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur Historian and a Reli- 
gious Citizen, 7 J.L. & RELIG. 415 (1989). 
47. MADISON, supra note 43, at 8. 
48. McConnell, supra note 20, at 1419. 
49. There remains a problem in situations where the legislature establishes a 
religion in the core sense. Would the courts be claiming improper authority, in my 
terms, were they to overturn such an establishment? Madison's statement in the 
Memorial and Remonstrance that "[rleligion is wholly exempt from [the] cognizance" 
of civil society, MADISON, supra note 43, at 6, suggests his perhaps inadequate an- 
swer: that the government lacks both power and authority to enact such an estab- 
lishment, and that judicial invalidation of an establishment does not thereby set up 
the judges as people who can determine the boundaries between the Deity and 
civil society. Hamilton restated the argument in the following terms: "For why de- 
clare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?" THE FEDER- 
ALIST NO. 84, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (empha- 
sis added). This articulation is somewhat more adequate when applied to a nation- 
al government with enumerated powers. 
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was directed. Second, and perhaps more important, the pre- 
Smith regime instituted a form of idolatry in its acquiescence 
to the judiciary as an institution that can authoritatively deter- 
mine when religious conscience ought, in the worldly domain, 
yield to government demand.50 The judiciary may have the 
power to determine the boundary between conscience and exec- 
utive or legislative power, but, on the sectarian interpretation 
of Madison's thought, it can never have authority to determine 
that boundary. Yet, on this interpretation, the idolatry that 
Madison criticized consisted precisely in that very confusion of 
power and authority. 
In one aspect, Smith almost explicitly offers this justifica- 
tion. Before Smith, government practices imposing burdens on 
religious exercise could be justified by some important or com- 
pelling secular interest. As courts struggled with this under- 
standing, they came to believe that they had to consider the 
place, central or otherwise, that the burdened activity had in a 
believer's religious universe; otherwise, they concluded, the 
government would be unable to  promote substantial yet 
noncompelling interests when they burdened trivial aspects of 
religious exercise. Smith argued that such an evaluation of the 
centrality of religious belief was essential t o  the coherence of 
the previous approach, and that judicial evaluation of the cen- 
trality of religious beliefs was fundamentally inconsistent with 
the premises of the Constitution's religion clauses.51 In other 
words, to the extent that a doctrine of free exercise exemptions 
requires such evaluations, it places judges in an authoritative 
position over religious belief in an idolatrous manner. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
How should believers respond to governmental assertions 
of authority? I have suggested a sectarian position, that they 
ought to deny such authority while acknowledging the sheer 
power of government t o  have its way. That, though, is precisely 
the regime that Smith establishes. In this way, Smith might be 
50. Permissible accommodations--that is, those chosen by legislatures as a mat- 
ter of policy-might not raise the question of idolatry, because they might rest, not 
on a legislative claim of authority to determine when amscience ought to yield, but 
on the legislature's recognition of the social reality that enforcing its prescriptions 
in the face of religious conscience would produce more social disharmony than that 
produced by allowing an exemption. 
51. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 US.  872, 886-87 & n.4 (1990). 
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viewed as a sectarian decision that acknowledges the power of 
government to act in matters affecting religious conscience but 
denies it the authority to do so. 
Still, this is a sectarian justification, and the First Amend- 
ment need not be interpreted to rely on a particular and con- 
testable view of the relation between religion and the rest of 
society's institutions. Therefore, as a matter of constitutional 
law, I do not offer this perspective as a defense of Smith. Rath- 
er, I offer it as an extraconstitutional view of the decision, a 
view that might be offered by an observer of the practice of 
constitutional law (as distinct from a practitioner of constitu- 
tional law).52 
Suppose that Smith does license the possibility of serious 
religious persecution. In this venue I need not remind readers 
that some religions have been shaped by the experience of 
persecution, and indeed, they have made that expe+ence cen- 
tral to their understanding of the relationship between God 
and the secular universe. The jurisdictional division I have 
sketched ultimately rests on the view-taken by my reli- 
gion-that religious believers reside in two territories: that of 
the state, in which they are physically located, and that of 
God.53 (In this way, being somewhat removed from law mak- 
ing is inherent to my understanding of my religious tradition.) 
Adherents of religions that have been shaped by the experience 
of persecution cannot easily forget that there are two territo- 
ries, even during the occasional periods of unilateral declara- 
tions of truce by the state. They know that their religions are 
always at risk. 
Others, though, may become too comfortable with the state 
in which they happen to reside. People may live too easily with 
the illusion that they will not suffer at the hands of others. For 
me, therefore, the issue is how to dissipate that illusion. And, 
in the end, that is necessarily a strategic judgment. I am not 
52. The distinction between observers and practitioners is, of course, not sharp. 
Though I may not make law in the dired sense that a legislator or judge does, or 
in the somewhat less dired sense that a litigator does, as a scholar I contribute to 
discussions that help shape legal and public understanding of the law. In that 
indirect sense, then, I am a practitioner. Yet, it is precisely the fact that I am 
somewhat removed from direct law making that allows me to offer my perspective. 
53. I put aside for the present the question of what happens when the Messiah 
comes-a point central to controversies between some orthodox Jews and religious 
Zionists, and a point that shows quite clearly that the perspective I am exploring 
is theological. 
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f d y  committed to the position that Smith is strategically 
justified in this sense; the illusion that the state is not "the 
Other" might be dissipated by other doctrines. However, the 
possibility that Smith is strategically justified is worth consid- 
ering. Perhaps religion is special, so that the lesson must be 
taught in co~ection with religion. Alternatively, perhaps the 
tradition of specifically religious tolerance in the United States 
has induced greater complacency as to religion than is justified. 
Finally, consider the three-tiered structure of pre-Smith 
law. Adherents of mainstream religions might not have seen 
the government as "the Other" because they benefited directly 
from legislative accommodations, and because they could take 
satisfaction in judicial protection of "close-in" nonmainstream 
religions. The latter religions are "close in" precisely because 
adherents of mainstream religions can sympathetically identify 
with them without sharing their views. The third tier consists 
of exotic religions, which are exotic precisely because adherents 
of mainstream religions cannot sympathetically identify with 
them. Before Smith, these religions would be persecuted, and 
adherents of mainstream religions would not be troubled. By 
eliminating the second tier, Smith authorizes the persecution of 
religions with which most people can sympathetically identify. 
It thereby demonstrates t o  all that the state is "the Other." 
All things considered, I believe that everyone ought to 
appreciate that we are all fundamentally at risk because of our 
religious commitments. In teaching that lesson, Smith makes 
an important contribution to the cause of religious liberty. 
